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Summary
Three groups of patients (right brain-damaged patients
with or without left neglect, and left brain-damaged
patients) and a group of healthy subjects, matched for
age and educational level to the three groups of patients,
were asked to report which of the two frontal surfaces
of Necker cubes oriented in four different ways looked,
at ﬁrst sight, nearer to the viewer. The extent to which,
and the way in which, disambiguation of the apparent
perspective of Necker cubes occurred was found to
vary across the four orientations and to be different in
left-neglect patients compared with subjects of the other
three groups. With normal subjects, the disambiguating
Keywords: unilateral neglect; Necker cube; spatial attention
Abbreviations:C5control subjects; L 5 left brain-damaged patients; LANDMARK-M 5 manual version of the Landmark
task; LANDMARK-V 5 verbal version of the Landmark task; R15right brain-damaged patients with left neglect;
R– 5 right brain-damaged patients without neglect
Introduction
Reversible-perspective cubes such as those shown in Fig. 1
were ﬁrst described by the Swiss crystallographer L. A.
Necker (1832) following his observation of rhomboid crystals
under the microscope (Gregory, 1970, 1981). They were
muchlaterthesubject ofsomewhatinconclusivepsychophilo-
sophical debate about the extent to which perception may be
viewed as a hypothetical–deductive process (for review, see
Gregory, 1981, p. 383 ff.). Wittgenstein’s (1953) ambiguous
notes about these ambiguous ﬁgures are, and will forever be,
worth reading because of their delicate lyricism; however,
they reﬂect an aesthetic contemplation of the phenomenon
(and of the intellectual problems it raises) rather than an
effort to proceed from it in order to elucidate the transition
from perception to conception or, in more recent terms,
from sensory-driven, ‘cognitively impenetrable’ processes to
knowledge-dependent, ratiocinative cognition. Like other
well-known ambiguous ﬁgures, the Necker cube was cher-
ished by Gestalt psychologists, who were much more adept
at discovering problematical phenomena concerning the way
we perceive the world around us than at conceiving scientiﬁc
© Oxford University Press 1999
factor is suggested to be a disposition to perceive the
upper surface, which is nearly orthogonal to the frontal
plane, as external to the cube. This would result from
a navigation of the observer’s spatial attention towards
its target along a particular path that is altered in
patients suffering from left neglect. It is suggested that
comparison of the paths followed by the attentional
vectors of normal subjects and left-neglect patients is
potentially fruitful for a better understanding of the
brain’s normal mechanisms of spatial attention and of
unresolved issues concerning the perception of the
Necker cube.
approaches to such phenomena (e.g. see Arnheim, 1986;
Hochberg, 1986; Perkins, 1986; Vone `che, 1986).
The ﬁrst steps towards an understanding of the processes
underlying the equivocal perception of the Necker cube were
made by showing that perspective reversals of ambiguous
ﬁgures are not prevented by the absence of retinal image
motion (Pritchard, 1958; Evans and Marsden, 1966; Gregory,
1970, p. 39 ff.) and that a skeleton cube coated with luminous
paint so that it glows in the dark undergoes visual reversal
even if held in the hand, i.e. despite the unchanged touch
information (Gregory, 1970, p. 40). Reversals, on the other
hand, are not accompanied by particular patterns of eye
movements (Flamm and Bergum, 1977). Later psychological
studies contributed further insight. It was found that changes
in the apparent distance of a vertex of the Necker cube
were associated with pupillometric changes similar to those
occurring with changes in real depth (Enright, 1987). Most
importantly, it was also found that if a Necker cube is
tachistoscopically ﬂashed so that one of the two central
vertices (e.g. central vertices B and H of cube 1 in Fig. 2)
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Fig. 1 Necker cubes.
coincides with the visual ﬁxation point, that vertex is per-
ceived as nearer (Kawabata, 1986; see also Kawabata
et al., 1978).
As might easily be expected, the Necker cube has also
been the subject of essays in artiﬁcial intelligence (e.g.
Simon, 1967; Feldman, 1985; Rumelhart et al., 1986) in
which alternative perceptions were suggested to result from
‘relaxation’ of a network into one of two possible (relatively)
steady states, depending on which units are initially activated
or inhibited. No conjecture, however, was made about what
precisely leads to the activation of one set of units to the
detriment of the rival set. As usual, therefore, it is still
uncertainwhethercomputersimulationprovidesonlyafascin-
ating metaphor of the way in which the features of the
Necker cube are processed in the brain.
Prompted by the ﬁndings of Kawabata and his co-workers,
we decided to investigate whether and how pathological (as
opposed to experimental) constraints imposed upon spatial
attention affect the perception of Necker cubes. We therefore
ran an experiment in which normal subjects and brain-
damaged patients, including patients suffering from left
visuospatial neglect, were asked for instant perceptual judge-
ments about the perspective of Necker cubes such as those
shown in Fig. 1. In agreement with Kawabata’s results, a
plausible expectation was that with cubes such as those
shown in the ﬁrst three columns of Fig. 1, where the two
internal vertices are located on opposite sides with respect
to the vertical midline, left-neglect patients would focus their
attention on the right-side internal vertex; this being perceived
as nearer than the opposite vertex. Consequently, one of the
two conﬂicting perspectives would emerge while perception
of the rival perspective would be inhibited. Another plausible
expectation, however, was that neglect patients would more
frequently judge the right frontal surface of these cubes as
nearer, because of a perceptual bias by which the left frontal
surface was seen as narrower (Milner and Harvey, 1995) and
therefore more distant. The results of the experiment did not
match these expectations and therefore required an ad hoc
interpretation that could not be grounded on earlier empirical
knowledge about the perception of the Necker cube in
normal subjects.
Method
Subjects
Four groups of subjects participated in the experiment. One
group (C) comprised 18 healthy subjects (10 male and 8
female) with mean age 53.78 years (SD 5 14.19 years) and
a mean educational level of 10.17 years (SD 5 3.15 years).
The other groups comprised 18 right brain-damaged patients
with left neglect (R1), 13 right brain-damaged patients free
from neglect (R–) and 15 left brain-damaged patients (L)
free from neglect with the exception of L patient 11. The
fourgroups ofsubjects didnotdiffer regardingage[F(3,60)5
1.31; P 5 0.280] and educational level [F(3,60) 5 1.95;
P 5 0.131]. Demographic and clinical data for brain-damaged
patients are reported in Tables 1–3. All subjects were right-
handed except L patient 10, who was an uncorrected left-
hander.
Contralesional neglect was deﬁned on the basis of either
(or both) of the following criteria: (i) mean error towards the
ipsilesional side in bisecting a series of ﬁve 180-mm long
and 1-mm thick black horizontal lines exceeding –10 mm
(leftwards, i.e. right neglect) or 10 mm (rightwards, i.e. left
neglect); (ii) left-side minus right-side omissions on the letter
H cancellation task (Diller and Weinberg, 1977) being equal
to 5 or more. Tables 1–3 show individual scores of brain-
damaged patients on bisection and cancellation tasks. As
regards the latter, an estimation of the neglected area was
given by the number of letters (targets and non-targets) lying
in the contralesional periphery, outside the border connecting
the leftmost (left neglect) or rightmost (right neglect) letter
Hcrossedoutoneachofthesixrowsoftargetsanddistractors;
because of the left–right asymmetry of the stimulus array,
optimal performance (minimum score) is 2 for right brain-
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Fig. 2 Disambiguation of cubes 1–4 by C and R1 attentional
vectors.
damaged and 10 for left brain-damaged patients. The reason
why we used this score was that comparison of the difference
in target omissions between the left and right halves of the
stimulus array is necessary in order to diagnose neglect but
would be greatly misleading in the assessment of its severity.
That difference would reach its maximum value with patients
who omitted all targets on the contralesional side of the array
(of target and non-target letters) and cancelled all targets on
the ipsilesional half. However, as the area of target omissions
further extends towards the ipsilesional side, the difference
starts decreasing while neglect actually increases. On the
other hand, using this score alone as the criterion for the
presence of neglect would wrongly classify (as neglect
patients) patients with spatially unselective attentional dis-
orders or patients whose attention was pathologically focused
on the central area of the stimulus array.
The study was approved by the ethical committee of the
Hospital Valduce; informed written consent was obtained
from each subject in the presence of a witness.
Stimuli and procedures
The stimuli were 16 Necker cubes shown in four orientations
(columns 1–4 in Fig. 1). The outlines of the (relatively)
frontal surfaces were one red and the other yellow in eight
cubes; they were one red and the other one green (as shown
in Fig. 1) in the remainder. All other edges were black. All
intersection points were white. The representation of each
cube was printed at the centre of a vertical sheet of A4 white
paper. The sides of the frontal surfaces measured 4 cm.
The entire set of cubes was shown 10 times, each item
being presented at reading distance on a table in front of the
subject; each time, the 16 cubes followed each other in a
ﬁxed random order. There were two blocked conditions
following one another. In the ﬁrst condition the subject had
to name the colour outlining the surface that looked at ﬁrst
sight nearer; in the second condition the subject had to name
the colour outlining the surface that looked at ﬁrst sight
farther away.
The R1 patients were also given two versions of the
Milner Landmark Task (Milner et al., 1993). In the verbal
response version (LANDMARK-V), 180-mm horizontal lines
composed of two segments of different length and printed in
different colours (black on the left and red on the right, or
vice versa) were shown. In a series of trials, patients had to
name the colour of the shorter (or longer) segment. In the
manual response version (LANDMARK-M), the lines were
black and the subdivision between the left and right segments
was marked by a short vertical bar superimposed on the
horizontal line. In a series of trials, patients had to point at
the shorter (or longer) segment. Two scores were computed
from each version of the task: a perceptual bias score and a
response bias score. From these scores, inferences can be
drawn concerning the relative weights of two (putatively)
different factors of neglect in individual patients. Procedural
and computational details are reported elsewhere (Bisiach
et al., 1998a). It will be mentioned here only that each score
may in principle range from 0 to 100. On the basis of cut-
offs drawn from normative data, the following values have
been held to indicate the presence of medium to severe
perceptual bias and/or response bias (corresponding to left
neglect) on the two versions of the task: perceptual bias
(LANDMARK-V) . 60.21; response bias (LANDMARK-
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Table 2 Demographic, clinical, and experimental data of R– patients
Patient Sex Age Education Length of Lesion Aetiology H Bisection Cube Cube 1 Cube 2 Cube 3 Cube 4
(years) (years) illness (days) (CT scan) canc 1, 2, 3
1 M 70 8 141 n.a. I 6 7.20 45.00 70.00 35.00 30.00 87.50
(5.76)
2 M 65 5 40 F, P I 2 0.00 56.67 100.00 0.00 70.00 2.50
(2.83)
3 F 69 5 50 bg, ci I 15 –0.60 55.83 100.00 25.00 42.50 92.50
(3.51)
4 M 52 13 62 F, P, T, bg I 9 5.40 51.67 82.50 22.50 50.00 57.50
(1.82)
5 F 65 5 52 T H 4 0.80 36.67 100.00 2.50 7.50 0.00
(7.26)
6 M 61 5 41 bg, ci I 2 2.00 59.17 67.50 47.50 62.50 80.00
(3.32)
7 F 46 13 33 T, ci, cs I 2 8.40 40.00 77.50 17.50 25.00 32.50
(3.78)
8 M 30 18 26 P H 6 1.40 61.67 95.00 80.00 10.00 70.00
(1.95)
9 F 78 12 65 ci, th H 2 –11.60 58.33 90.00 52.50 32.50 100.00
(2.61)
10 F 69 8 76 Unapparent I 2 7.60 53.33 95.00 27.50 37.50 95.00
(3.51)
11 F 79 5 39 bg H 10 8.20 40.00 87.50 7.50 25.00 25.00
(4.66)
12 M 57 8 43 P, T H 5 1.20 67.50 90.00 55.00 57.50 82.50
(7.92)
13 F 64 5 40 F, bg I 14 5.80 56.67 82.50 22.50 65.00 47.50
(4.82)
For explanation of abbreviations see footnote to Table 1.
V) . 52.64; perceptual bias (LANDMARK-M) . 60.15;
response bias (LANDMARK-M) . 51.74.
Results
AsisevidentfromFig.1,andduetothedifferentperspectives,
the two frontal surfaces of cubes such as those shown in
columns 1–3 (henceforth referred to as cubes 1, 2 and 3) are
horizontally separated with respect to one another, so that
one is shifted to the left (henceforth referred to as the left
surface; e.g. the surface outlined in red in the cube shown
in the left upper corner of Fig. 1) and the other one is shifted
to the right (henceforth referred to as the right surface; e.g.
the surface outlined in green in that cube). Similarly, the two
frontal surfaces of cubes such as those shown in column 4
(henceforth referred to as cubes 4) are vertically separated
with respect to one another so that one is shifted upwards
(henceforth referred to as the upper surface; e.g. the surface
outlined in green in the cube shown in the right upper corner
of Fig. 1) and the other is shifted downwards (henceforth
referred to as the lower surface; e.g. the surface outlined in
red in that cube).
The combined percentages of ‘nearer’ responses given by
patients to left surfaces and ‘farther’ responses given by
them to right surfaces with cubes 1, 2 and 3, as well as the
combined percentages of ‘nearer’ responses given to upper
surfaces and ‘farther’ responses given to lower surfaces with
cubes 4, are individually reported in Tables 1–3, in which
the cumulative percentages concerning cubes 1, 2 and 3 are
also listed. Group means, including the mean for group C,
are reported in Table 4.
All statistical analyses of the results were carried out
following angular transformation of percentage values. An
ANOVA (analysis of variance) with group as four-level
between-subjects factor (C, R1, R– and L) and type of cube
as three-level within-subject factor (cubes 1, 2 and 3) showed
a signiﬁcant effect of group [F(3,60) 5 5.43; P , 0.002].
Post hoc comparisons (Tukey test with signiﬁcance level set
at P , 0.05) showed that the behaviour of R1 patients was
signiﬁcantly different from that of the other three groups,
among which no signiﬁcant differences were found. On
average, only in R1 patients was the percentage of identiﬁca-
tions of the left surfaces of cubes 1, 2 and 3 as nearer (62.22)
signiﬁcantly different from 50% [t(17) 5 3.58; P , 0.002].
The effect of type of cube was also signiﬁcant [F(2,120) 5
94.95; P , 0.0001], as was the group 3 type of cube
interaction [F(6,120) 5 3.90; P , 0.001]. One-way ANOVA
showed a signiﬁcant effect of group for cubes 1 [F(3,60) 5
3.90; P , 0.02], cubes 2 [F(3,60) 5 4.55; P , 0.01] and
cubes 3 [F(3,60) 5 4.43; P , 0.01]. In post hoc comparisons
(Tukey test), signiﬁcant differences were found between
groups L and C and between groups L and R– for cubes 1,
between groups R1 and C and between groups R1 and L
for cubes 2, between groups R1 and C and between groups
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Table 3 Demographic, clinical and experimental data of L patients
Patient Sex Age Education Length of Lesion Aetiology H Bisection Cube Cube 1 Cube 2 Cube 3 Cube 4
(years) (years) illness (days) (CT scan) canc 1, 2, 3
1 F 45 8 53 F, T ci H 10 3.40 55.83 80.00 37.50 50.00 67.50
(1.34)
2 F 59 5 23 ci I 10 –1.60 52.50 70.00 35.00 52.50 75.00
(1.67)
3 F 75 5 21 ci, cs I 10 –4.40 53.33 95.00 7.50 57.50 27.50
(0.55)
4 F 77 5 18 ci, th H 10 2.40 48.33 72.50 42.50 30.00 85.00
(2.97)
5 F 55 5 32 bg, ci I 10 –2.80 53.33 70.00 22.50 67.50 82.50
(3.96)
6 F 70 17 21 bg, ci, cs I 10 –4.00 36.67 62.50 2.50 45.00 67.50
(1.58)
7 F 46 13 43 bg, ci I 10 –3.60 55.00 95.00 17.50 52.50 97.50
(2.88)
8 F 54 5 79 bg, ci H 10 –1.60 45.83 70.00 30.00 37.50 85.00
(2.51)
9 M 56 5 28 bg, ci I 10 –3.40 55.83 57.50 45.00 65.00 57.50
(5.18)
10 F 56 5 55 bg, ci H 10 –1.20 40.00 65.00 10.00 45.00 100.00
(3.27)
11 M 67 5 69 F, P, T I 10 –13.20 67.50 72.50 57.50 72.50 97.50
(4.02)
12 F 70 4 77 ci I 10 –8.20 37.50 72.50 2.50 37.50 70.00
(8.70)
13 M 55 8 30 P N 10 –4.60 57.50 77.50 20.00 75.00 100.00
(6.11)
14 F 74 8 42 F, cs H 13 –2.80 36.67 65.00 35.00 10.00 87.50
(1.48)
15 F 61 8 52 F, O, P H 10 –4.60 44.17 47.50 50.00 35.00 75.00
(1.52)
For explanation of abbreviations see footnote to Table 1.
Table 4 Mean percentages (and SDs) of ‘nearer’ responses to left (cubes 1, 2, 3) or upper (cube 4) surfaces given by C,
R1, R– and L subjects
Cube C R1 R– L
1 83.47* (15.51) 76.53* (18.03) 87.50 * (10.99) 71.50 * (12.42)
2 22.50* (16.27) 46.53 (23.01) 30.38* (23.14) 27.67 * (17.51)
3 46.25 (21.87) 63.61* (17.56) 39.62 (20.43) 48.83 (17.52)
Mean 50.74 (8.76) 62.22* (12.62) 52.50 (9.37) 49.33 (9.04)
4 70.97* (25.43) 79.86* (13.60) 59.42 (34.99) 78.33* (19.29)
*Signiﬁcantly different from 50.00%.
R1 and R– for cubes 3 (cf. means reported in Table 4). With
cubes 1, the left surface was more frequently perceived as
nearer by C subjects [t(17) 5 7.32; P , 0.0001], R1 patients
[t(17) 5 5.75; P , 0.0001], R– patients [t(12) 5
8.12; P , 0.0001] and L patients [t(14) 5 5.71; P , 0.0001].
With cubes 2, the left surface was more frequently perceived
as farther by C subjects [t(17) 5 –6.21; P , 0.0001], R–
patients [t(12) 5 –2.98; P , 0.02] and L patients [t(14) 5
–4.60;P,0.0001],whereasnosigniﬁcantdifferencebetween
the two competing perceptions was found in R1 patients.
With cubes 3, there was no signiﬁcant difference between
the two competing perceptions of the left surface in groups
C, R– and L; the left surface was instead more frequently
perceived as nearer by R1 patients [t(17) 5 3.07; P , 0.01].
Regarding cubes 4, a one-way ANOVA did not show
signiﬁcant intergroup differences. The upper surface was
more frequently perceived as nearer by C subjects [t(17) 5
3.37; P , 0.005], R1 patients [t(17) 5 8.38; P , 0.0001]
and L patients [t(14) 5 4.93; P , 0.0001], whereas no
signiﬁcant difference between the two competing perceptions
was found in R– patients.
No signiﬁcant correlations were found in group R1
between the scores for the Necker cube task and the scores
for the bisection and letter H cancellation tasks, or between
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the former and the length of illness. The frequency with
which the left surface of cubes 3 was perceived as nearer by
R1 patients was instead found to be positively correlated
with perceptual bias (LANDMARK-M) [r(18) 5 0.59; P ,
0.01] and negatively correlated with response bias (LAND-
MARK-V) [r(18) 5 -0.53; P , 0.05]. The frequency with
which these patients perceived the upper surface of cubes 4
as nearer was found to be positively correlated with response
bias (LANDMARK-M) [r(18) 5 0.47; P , 0.05]. The
frequency with which R1 patients perceived the left surface
of cubes 2 as nearer also showed a slight positive correlation
with response bias (LANDMARK-M) approaching signiﬁc-
ance [r(18) 5 0.43; P 5 0.076].
Inspection of Table 1 does not reveal any particular
relationships between the behaviour of individual R1 patients
on the Necker cube task and the intrahemispheric location
of the lesion.
No correlation analysis was performed in order to investi-
gate the relationships between collateral tasks (bisection,
letter H cancellation and Landmark tests) because data about
these relationships are already available from much larger
groups of neglect patients (Bisiach et al., 1998a, b).
Interpretation
The main results of the experiment may be summarized as
follows (Table 4). With cubes 1, the left surface was much
more frequently perceived as nearer by all groups of subjects
(though this tendency was somewhat weaker in group L).
With cubes 2, the left surface was less frequently perceived
as nearer by all groups of subjects, except group R1. With
cubes 3, the left surface was perceived as nearer or farther
with about equal frequency by all groups except group
R1, in which it was more frequently perceived as nearer.
Cumulatively, only R1 patients perceived the left surfaces
of cubes 1, 2 and 3 more frequently as nearer. With cubes
4, the upper surface was more frequently perceived as nearer
by all groups of subjects; however, this tendency was
deﬁnitely more evident in groups R1 and L (and less evident
in group R–, where it was not signiﬁcant).
Since these results do not conﬁrm the expectations set out
in the Introduction, an alternative, tentative interpretation is
presented as follows.
Early perceptual processing of two-dimensional visual
stimuli such as those shown in Fig. 2 leads to a ‘cognitively
impenetrable’ (Pylyshyn, 1985)—i.e. incorrigible—inter-
pretation of each of those conﬁgurations as the perspective
of a three-dimensional object. The binary perceptual reversib-
ility of this perspective is itself, to a large extent, cognitively
impenetrable: no matter how strenuously a normal observer
endeavours to entertain only one of the two competing and
mutually exclusive perspectives, the other one pops out at
variable intervals and for variable time. However, our results
demonstrate that the ambiguity of Necker cubes such as
those shown in Fig. 2 is not absolute, because at least in
some instances (cubes 1, 2 and 4) the perceptual judgement
of normal subjects is at ﬁrst sight biased towards one of the
two alternative interpretations. The literature on the Necker
cube does not seem to offer any clue to the understanding
of this bias, except for the results reported by Kawabata and
hisco-workers(seeIntroduction),which,asweshallpresently
see, give insufﬁcient grounds for an exhaustive explanation
of our results. If so, the only choice with which we are left
is to start with a speculative working hypothesis and see how
it ﬁts the data. We may therefore tentatively assume that, once
early perceptual processing presents the ﬂat conﬁguration of
a Necker cube as a three-dimensional object compatible with
either of two contrasting perspectives, the disambiguation is
carried out by the dynamics of a complex attentional vector.
Such a vector cannot be viewed as leading straight ahead
from the observer to the visual stimulus as a whole, or to
any of its details, because there seems to be no way in which
the disambiguation could in this case be obtained under free
viewing conditions (i.e. if not artiﬁcially constrained, e.g. by
means such as those contrived by Kawabata and his co-
workers). Consequently, we have to envisage an attentional
vector impacting on the critical stimulus through a different
route. Given that in our environment most (relatively small)
three-dimensional objects, such as those (ambiguously) rep-
resented by Necker-cube drawings, lie on a supporting surface
parallel to the ground and are most frequently viewed from
above, we suggest that in the conditions of our experiment
the ﬁnal trajectory of the attentional vector of normal subjects
(vector C in Fig. 2) is perpendicularly directed from above
towards the centre of the ﬂat conﬁguration after it has been
interpreted as the centre of a (still ambiguous) cube. The ﬁrst
surface on which the vector impacts is therefore interpreted as
a surface external to the cube.
On this hypothesis, we would indeed expect what is shown
in Fig. 2. With cubes 1 and 2, the vector impacts on surface
AEFB. This surface being interpreted as external, the left
frontal surface ABCD of cube 1 is more frequently (83.47%)
and the left frontal surface EFGH of cube 2 less frequently
(22.50%) perceived as nearer to the observer. With cube 3,
it impacts on the ambiguous intersection of surfaces ABFE
and BFGC; the left frontal surface ABCD is therefore nearly
as frequently perceived as nearer (46.25) or farther. With
cube 4, it impacts on the upper frontal surface ABCD
(standing out due to perceptual grouping on the basis of
colour), which is therefore more frequently perceived as
nearer (70.97%).
It is logically evident (and easy, though time-consuming,
to check) that a rotation of the C vector in the frontal plane
around the centre of cubes 1–4 would lead to predictions
incompatible with the results of the experiment.
Regarding the left-neglect patients, their behaviour can be
interpreted by assuming that, as a consequence of the brain
lesion, the normal ﬁnal trajectory of the attentional vector,
though remaining in the frontal plane where the centre of
the ambiguous cube is apparently located, is to some extent
(by 45° in Fig. 2) bent to the right. With cube 1, the R1
vector would thus impact on the edge connecting surfaces
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AEFB and BFGC; since these surfaces are interpreted by the
brain as external to the cube, the left frontal surface ABCD
is still more frequently perceived as nearer (76.53%). With
cube 2 it would impact on the ambiguous intersection of
surfaces AEFB and FBCG, so that the left frontal surface
EFGH, which looked farther to normal subjects, is nearly as
frequently perceived nearer (46.53%) as farther. With cube
3, it would impact on surface BFGC; this surface being
interpreted as external, left-neglect patients (unlike normal
subjects) perceive the left frontal surface ABCD more fre-
quently as nearer (63.61). Finally, with cube 4, the R1 vector
would impact, like the C vector, on the upper frontal surface
ABCD, which is therefore also more frequently perceived as
nearer (79.86%) by left-neglect patients.
With cubes 1 and 3, the ﬁndings of Kawabata could
support an alternative and very plausible explanation of our
patients’ behaviour. If, due to contralesional visual neglect,
attention had been focused on the internal vertex B, rather
than having been divided between it and the internal vertex
H, with cube 1, and on the internal vertex C, rather than
having been divided between it and the internal vertex E,
with cube 3, then the attended vertices (and therefore surfaces
ABCD) would have appeared nearer to the viewer. Figure 2
shows that this was indeed what we found. However, focusing
attention on vertex G with cube 2 would have led to more
frequent perception of left frontal surface EFGH as nearer,
which was not the case. Furthermore, left neglect would not
have biased attention on either internal vertex with cube 4,
since both vertices F and D lie on the same vertical line;
contrary to our results, no disambiguation would in this case
be entailed. On the other hand, the alternative expectation of
more frequent choices of right frontal surfaces as nearer, due
to the perceptual bias mentioned in the introduction, is totally
incompatible with the actual results obtained with each type
of cube.
Discussion
According to the above interpretation, the results of the
experiment support the view that both in normal subjects
and in left-neglect patients the dynamics of spatial attention
required for the disambiguation of visual patterns such as
the Necker cube should be conceived in terms of a mental
analogue of three-dimensional navigation in real space rather
than in terms of a beam of straight vectors leading directly
from the viewer to conﬁgurational details. If the second
alternative were the correct one, the two rival percepts of
any variant of the Necker cube would (in the absence of any
experimental constraints of the kind we mentioned in the
introduction) be equiprobable.
What is suggested here is in some way similar to Gibson’s
(1966, p. 266–286) concept of ‘affordance’. If, for example,
the perspective of cube 1 in Fig. 2 were slightly changed so
that vertices B and H were made to coincide, the conﬁguration
would be much more likely to be perceived as the ﬂat surface
of a hexagon radially subdivided into six sectors. As soon
as these vertices move away from one another, however, the
conﬁguration is perceived as a three-dimensional transparent
object ‘inviting’ potential actions—such as inspecting, reach-
ing and grasping—that are instrumental in normal perception,
if the latter is held to occur ‘only when a viewer moves
aboutinanaturalenvironment’(Hochberg,1986,p.290).Two
incompatible sets of actions are thereby set in competition by
the perspective ambiguity of the conﬁguration. Which set
wins depends on further attentional processes specifying how
the observer would relate to the object if it were a three-
dimensional object.
In interpreting the results of the experiment we have
assumed that the attentional vector aimed at disambiguating
the Necker cube reaches it from above in normal subjects,
but obliquely from above and the right in left-neglect patients.
We have also assumed that the way the Necker cube is
perceiveddependsonwhichsurfacethevectorﬁrstencounters
and treats as external. Former interpretations have instead
focused on the role of vertices (e.g. Simon, 1967; Kawabata,
1986; Feldman, 1985; Rumelhart et al., 1986; Enright, 1987).
However, there seems to be no parsimonious way in which
our results might be accounted for by hypothesizing vertices
or edges, rather than surfaces, as foci of (normal or patholo-
gical) spatial attention.
On our interpretation, the ﬁnal trajectory of the R1 vector
of spatial attention, rather than being perpendicular to the
centre of a Necker cube, as in normal subjects, is bent
towards the contralesional side. (It is worth noting that a
slight, similar tendency regarding the vector of L patients is
suggested by their perceiving the left surface of cubes 1 as
nearer signiﬁcantly less often than C subjects.) Why should
this happen? It has been suggested that the metrics of space
representation are contingent upon the equilibrium emerging
in a widespread neuronal network of space-coding neurons
(such as those investigated by, for example, Graziano and
Gross, 1994; Galletti et al., 1995; Fogassi et al., 1996) from
a system of functional counterforts. Unilateral brain damage
could result in a one-sided lack of counterpoise in such a
system and lead to anisometry of the medium for space
representation (Bisiach et al., 1998b). This would imply a
left–right skewness of the dynamics of spatial attention,
giving rise to contralesional neglect and related phenomena.
This might also be the reason why the attentional vector
implied in the disambiguation of the Necker cube, being
initially pushed rightwards in R1 patients (Kinsbourne,
1970), must turn towards its target from right to left and
impact (as shown in Fig. 2) on the surface(s) approachable
by its ﬁnal trajectory and therefore more prone to being
perceived as external to the apparently three-dimensional
object. (We obviously refer to the dynamics of ‘covert’
attention, since we expect that nothing would change in R1
patients following retinal ﬁxation of the ambiguous ﬁgures
by using, for example, the after-image technique.) As a
consequence, the left frontal surfaces of cubes 1, 2 and 3,
far from being neglected, are (cumulatively) more frequently
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perceived as nearer (or ‘showing’) rather than farther (or
‘hidden’).
It is hardly possible, so far, to make well-grounded
conjectures about the precise nature of the brain dysfunction
leading to the particular disambiguation of the Necker cube
that has been found to be associated with right hemisphere
damage giving rise to neglect. Nonetheless, it would be
unjustiﬁed to totally disregard the clues offered, no matter
how problematically, by the pattern of correlations between
the behaviour of left-neglect patients on the Necker cube
task and the Landmark tasks. Although fairly complicated,
the results of our correlational analyses do indeed suggest
that both perceptual and response-related biases could be
responsible for the ways patients with left neglect, taken as
a group, disambiguate variants of the Necker cube such as
those used in the experiment. This is far from surprising,
because the results of an extensive investigation of the
Landmark task (Bisiach et al., 1998a) show that perceptual
and response biases, though double-dissociated, are not
mutually exclusive and may co-determine the occurrence of
neglect phenomena. Further work on single cases is, of
course, required to clarify the respective contributions of
perceptual and response biases in the disambiguation of the
Necker cube by left-neglect patients; however, to the extent
to which response-related factors may be held to reveal a
premotor dysfunction, their implication in the mechanisms
through which the Necker cube is disambiguated by left-
neglect patients supports the view according to which these
mechanisms are partly based (in these patients, as well as in
normal subjects) on what the ﬂat, but apparently three-
dimensional, conﬁguration affords for potential actions at the
level of mental representation.
We were not able to ﬁnd a satisfactory explanation for the
lack of correlation between the results of the Necker cube
task and the results of bisection and cancellation tasks,
which is a vexing paradox since line bisection and letter H
cancellation were in fact chosen as criteria for the selection
of our group of neglect patients. More than ever, one is
apparently forced to share Halligan and Marshall’s (1992)
scepticism regarding the ‘validity of any unitary concept’ of
unilateral visuospatial neglect. However, the different pattern
of correlation of the results of bisection and cancellation
tasks with perceptual and response bias scores on the verbal
and manual versions of the Landmark test (Bisiach et al.,
1998a) suggests that the lack of correlation between the
former and the Necker cube task is due to reciprocal masking
of two different factors of unilateral neglect affecting the
way patients perceive this ambiguous conﬁguration: one
more easily revealed by bisection errors, and the other by
the inability to carry out the step-after-step visual scanning
of a complex stimulus array.
Conclusions
The results of the experiment were not as we expected on
the basis of earlier empirical knowledge about the perception
of the Necker cube by normal subjects and knowledge of the
attentional disorders giving rise to unilateral visuospatial
neglect. The interpretation we offer is tentative and invites
further investigation, which may or may not support it. In
any case, the resultsof the experiment are challengingvisa ` vis
one of the oldest—and still fascinating—issues of perceptual
psychology. Furthermore, they strongly suggest that tasks of
uni- or bidimensional perception such as those traditionally
employed in the study of unilateral neglect should be supple-
mented by tasks based on the perception of (really or
apparently) three-dimensional stimuli if we want to gain
deeper insight into the attentional dynamics underlying this
disorder and consequently into the dynamics of spatial
attention in the normal brain.
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